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SINKING OF THE 'MIGHTY' HOOD
21st May 1941 - Bismarck Leaves Norway
Lütjens's force had sailed from Bergen during the early evening of 21 May. The poor weather conditions were perfect for an undetected departure. The question remains as to why he did not refuel Bismarck. It is possible that he initially intended to refuel from the tanker Weissenberg in the Arctic. It is also possible that as the hours passed, he felt it wiser to make for the Denmark Strait as quickly as possible, lest they lose the cover of the bad weather. Whatever his reason, it was another decision he would later regret.
During the morning of 22 May, the escorting destroyers parted company with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Lütjens's force continued to steam north until the early afternoon, when the course was altered to northwest in preparation for the run through the Denmark Strait. The foggy weather continued to provide a shield from observation by British aircraft or surface vessels. At just before midnight the southwest turn that would take them through the Denmark Strait was executed. Later the speed of the squadron was increased to 24 to 27 knots in an attempt to ensure that the breakout was achieved before the favourable weather turned. This was the most dangerous part of the operation so far - the navigable channel was only 30 to 40 miles wide at this time of year. If the British had discovered their intentions there would be patrols. If the fog held, they might be lucky and slip through despite these. Unfortunately for the Germans, the conditions were changing. In the late afternoon the fog lifted and visibility increased to 3 to 10 miles.
22nd May 1941 Hood's Departure from Scapa Flow
Hood, Prince of Wales and their destroyer escorts, weighed anchor at 2356 hours. They departed Scapa Flow at midnight, 22 May, enroute for Hvalsfjord. They cleared Scapa's Hoxa Gate at 0050 hours. Shortly thereafter, the destroyers were divided into two divisions- one to screen Hood and the other to screen Prince of Wales. The vessels then commenced zigzagging (for anti-submarine purposes) and assumed a heading of 310°. Sometime that morning, VADM Holland informed his commanders of the gunnery policy he wanted: 'If the enemy is encountered and concentration of fire required, the policy will be G.I.C. (individual ship control); if ships are spread when enemy is met they are to be prepared to flank mark as described in H.W.C.O. 26'. Due to the implementation of strict radio silence, these orders were never communicated to Suffolk or Norfolk.
Between 1130 and 1307 hours, a Range and Inclination Exercise (RIX) was successfully conducted. The first destroyer division continued to screen Hood and the second continued to screen Prince of Wales. Afterwards, all vessels resumed their zigzagging on a heading of 310°. This continued until 1855 hours, when the course was altered to 283°.
By noon, 23 May, the vessels would be at 62° 55' N 02° 14.8' W and on a heading of 270°. Shortly thereafter, another successful RIX was conducted. At 1400 hours, the destroyers Anthony and Antelope, short on fuel, parted company with the force and headed for Iceland. As the day wore on for the remaining vessels, the weather grew cloudy and the sea swells became heavier. The monotony was briefly broken at 1708 hours, when Prince of Wales's radar detected an aircraft. It turned out to be friendly.
By 2054 hours, Hood's force was proceeding at 27 knots on a heading of 295º. As the speed increased, the destroyers struggled to maintain station in the heavy seas. VADM Holland signalled to the destroyers "If you are unable to maintain this speed, I will have to go on without you. You should follow at your best speed". The four tiny destroyers did their best to keep up with the old battle cruiser fairly but took a horrendous buffeting in doing so.
At 2200 hours, the crews of Hood, Prince of Wales and their accompanying destroyers were officially notified of the Germans presence in the Denmark Strait. Interception and action was expected to take place between 0140 and 0200 hours that morning. All hands were ordered to be prepared to change into clean undergarments (to help prevent infection should they be wounded) and to don battle gear (life vests, flash gear, gas masks, helmets and, where necessary, cold weather gear). At 2230 hours, 'darken ship' was ordered. By 0015 hours, 24 May, crews aboard both ships had been called to action stations and battle ensigns raised. They were then an estimated 120 miles / 222 km south of the German ships.
Bismarck- Lost and Found on the High Seas
Very late that evening, Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck: At one point it appeared to Suffolk that Bismarck had reversed course and was heading towards her. This being the case, Captain Ellis ordered an immediate alteration of Suffolk's own course. By the time they had realised that Bismarck had not reversed course towards them and returned to their original bearing, the German vessels had disappeared into the snowstorm. Suffolk attempted to keep contact with her radar it proved impossible in the circumstances.
So it was that shortly after midnight, Suffolk reported that she had lost radar contact with the German vessels. Aboard Hood, VADM Holland, in his usual reserved fashion, calmly received the news. With no definite position or bearing for the German warships, he ordered that the crews to go to relaxed action stations (permission to sleep or at least relax at action stations) and a reduction in the ships' speed to 25 knots. The heading changed to the north (340º) in order to cover any possible reversal of course by the Germans.
At this stage it was a guessing game for the British forces. It is often forgotten in articles on the loss of Hood that the relative positions of the ships at the time of the engagement was not entirely for VADM Holland to decide for himself. Loss of contact by Suffolk was a blow and suggested that the German squadron may well have altered course. This being the case, he had to decide what that course alteration might be. They may have decided that having been tracked it was likely that British forces would be concentrated to intercept them, and that it would be better to reverse course and disappear into the Arctic Ocean. Alternatively, they may have altered course to the south-east or the south-west. In any case, it seemed to Holland that the best course of action was to close the distance between his ships and the last known position of the German squadron as quickly as possible at this point.
Holland must have known that the worst possible scenario was for Bismarck and Prinz Eugen to slip by and out into the Atlantic to the east or west of his squadron as he hurried north. He therefore signalled to his force at 0030 hours that "If enemy is not in sight by 0210, I will probably alter course 180º until cruisers regain touch". He then once again signalled his battle plan: "Intend both ships to engage Bismarck and to leave [Prinz Eugen] to Norfolk and Suffolk". Of course, due to the ban on radio usage, this message was not transmitted to either Suffolk or Norfolk. At about this time, Prince of Wales intended to send up her Walrus seaplane for reconnaissance purposes. Unfortunately, the weather quickly deteriorated, forcing the flight to be cancelled. The Walrus was de-fuelled and put back in its hangar.
At 0147 hours, Holland signalled "If battlecruisers turn 200º at 0205 destroyers continue to search to the northward". Due to the poor weather and restricted visibility, it is not known if all four destroyers received the order. This order gives an indication of the extent to which, just a few hours before the engagement took place the British forces were 'searching in the dark'. At 0203 hours, just after dawn (approximately 0200 hours in those latitudes at that time of year), Hood and Prince of Wales assumed a more southerly course of 200º at a speed of 25 knots. The destroyers then parted with the large ships to screen at 15 mile intervals to the north. This was to better the chances of locating the Germans should they successfully elude the Suffolk and Norfolk. Holland also ordered Prince of Wales to use her Type 284 gunnery radar to search 020 - 140º. Unfortunately, Prince of Wales's Type 284 radar was experiencing troubles which rendered it more or less defective. Captain Leach therefore requested permission to use the somewhat more powerful Type 281 radar, but his request was refused, as the transmissions/emissions would have caused great interference to Hood's own Type 284 radar.
At 0247 hours, Suffolk fortunately regained radar contact with the fleeing German vessels. Her reports placed the Germans approximately 35 miles/64.8 km north-west of Hood and Prince of Wales. Holland ordered another heading change, this time to 220º. Speed was gradually increased to 28 knots (as high as 28.8 knots per Prince of Wales's log for 24 May 1941)..
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